DailyGeopoliticsSat, 3 Oct 2026Published 21:38 UTC

Russia hit Kyiv bridges and traded nuclear-Article 5 warnings as Ethiopia and Eritrea cut ties and Gaza strikes continued under Hormuz closure

The day in 30 seconds

All situations side by side · state, direction, Pulses, coverage
State · move in 24hΔ 24h
  1. Gaza warLethal strikes in Gaza and coordinated settler attacks in the West Bank continued on 2026-10-03 despite the year-old ceasefire… rising
    model-assessed
    ◆ 0 rising
  2. US-Iran-Houthi confrontationHormuz remains effectively closed with no formal US counter-offer conveyed via mediators… steady
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    ▼ −7 steady
  3. Russia-Ukraine warRussia extended its Kyiv pressure campaign from energy to river crossings… rising
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    ◆ 0 falling
  4. Ethiopia-Eritrea ruptureEthiopia and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties on Oct 1 in a tit-for-tat embassy closure… rising
    model-assessed
    ◆ 0 newly reported
  5. US withdrawal from IraqThe September 30 completion of the US withdrawal from Erbil remains the defining fact… steady
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    ◆ 0 steady
The day, in more detail (6)
The day
  • Ethiopia and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties Oct 1 and federal forces likely retook Mekelle's Alula Aba Nega Airport Oct 3…
  • Russia struck Kyiv's Southern Bridge Oct 1-2 and Northern Bridge Oct 3 and launched 150+ drone salvos killing at least 8…
  • Israeli airstrike on a Gaza City apartment killed at least five Oct 3 and coordinated settler attacks injured 16 across Nablus…
  • Hormuz remained effectively closed with no formal US counter-offer via mediators…

Gaza war and UNGA diplomatic fallout · situation → , gradual pace

Lethal strikes in Gaza and coordinated settler attacks in the West Bank continued on 2026-10-03 despite the year-old ceasefire…

The war in Gaza between Israel and Palestinian groups and violence in the occupied West Bank are linked. In Gaza, fighting has produced a severe humanitarian crisis and repeated ceasefires.

Numbers match the timeline. Solid mark: researched; hollow: reported. Infrastructure, lettered by type (P power plant); colour is the latest status on record: claimed struck (a party's claim only), damage reported, damage confirmed or destroyed, restored, nothing on record. A claim is a party's word, not a confirmation; marks fade as a status ages. Power plants: WRI Global Power Plant Database (CC BY 4.0).
Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Locations: Ohmega, from today's developments; approximate. Shipping data: IMF PortWatch. Interactive basemap: OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors.
  1. 3 Oct1
  2. 2
  3. 1 Oct3
Assessment and what changed · the full read, since yesterday

Lethal strikes in Gaza and coordinated settler attacks in the West Bank continued on 2026-10-03 despite the year-old ceasefire, with an airstrike on a Gaza City apartment killing at least five and multi-village olive-harvest attacks injuring 16. A systematic DRC survey published 2026-10-01 quantifies the humanitarian squeeze: 1.8 million people (86%) remain in protracted displacement as the Israeli-controlled Yellow Line creeps west. Diplomatic spillover is unchanged — no new EU settlement-goods bans or accreditation revocations beyond the Netherlands/UK actions of late September — with confidence high on the new violence and displacement findings (researched) and low on any de-escalation.

  • Escalated: Gaza lethality new 2026-10-03 airstrike on Remal apartment (≥5 killed, ≥6 wounded…
  • Escalated: West Bank settler violence from single Yasuf killing (2026-10-01) to coordinated multi-village olive-harvest attacks across Nablus on 2026-10-03 (16 injured…
  • New: Systematic humanitarian evidence DRC 'Confined by Design' (2026-10-01) quantifies 1.8m/86% in displacement…

1 unchanged: Diplomatic spillover: no new EU settlement-goods bans or Israeli accreditation actions beyond Netherlands (22 Sep ban / 27 Sep revocation) and UK (8-9 Sep); no UAE-Israel follow-up announcement after 28 Sep visit and 29 Sep UNGA statement.

Pulses (4) · how tense, 0 to 100

A Pulse is a 0 to 100 gauge of how tense one specific situation is, from calm at the bottom to extreme at the top. It is reassessed whenever new evidence arrives, so the number moves with events.

model-assessed
Outlook, watch list and background

Outlook Lethal strikes and settler harvest attacks are likely to continue at a low but steady rate while the ceasefire holds nominally, given the pattern of 5,147 alleged violations and no announced investigations or restraints. Diplomatic spillover is likely to stay steady in the near term — additional EU settlement-goods bans or Israeli accreditation revocations are possible but not indicated in the last three days. Humanitarian conditions are almost certain to worsen as winter approaches without fuel/generator resupply, as flagged by both the Health Ministry and DRC.

Watch for
  • Whether Israeli authorities announce investigation, arrests, or restraint measures after the 2026-10-03 Remal strike and Nablus olive-picker attacks, or further incidents follow
  • Whether any of Gaza's 19 functioning hospitals suspend ICU, imaging or surgery citing fuel/generator failure in coming days
  • Whether additional EU states announce or begin enforcing settlement-goods bans, or Israel revokes status for another EU mission beyond the Netherlands/UK
Background
  • 22 Sept 2026Netherlands began enforcing 22 September 2026 ban on import, purchase and sale of goods wholly or partly from unlawful Israeli settlements (West Bank, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights), including in personal luggage. The measure triggered Israel's diplomatic retaliation and frames current EU-Israel trade tensions; no additional EU states have enforced similar bans in the last three days. douane.nl ↗
  • 27 Sept 2026On 27 September 2026 Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar announced revocation of Israeli-issued accreditation for Dutch diplomats at the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah, with seven days to return documents, and said Israel had removed the Dutch delegation from the International Support Center for Gaza in Kiryat Gat. Sets baseline for diplomatic spillover; no new revocations beyond Netherlands/UK have been announced since. aljazeera.com ↗
  • 8 Sept 2026On 8-9 September 2026 Israel told the UK to close its Consulate General in occupied East Jerusalem within 30 days and to remove representatives from the Kiryat Gat center within seven days after the UK banned settlement-goods imports. Earlier UK-Israel retaliation that defines the current diplomatic deadlock alongside the Netherlands case. aljazeera.com ↗
  • 27 Sept 2026About 70% of hospital generators in Gaza are no longer operational; Nasser Hospital, Al Aqsa Martyrs Hospital, Jaffa Hospital and Al Ahli Arab Hospital have had failures forcing suspension of imaging/diagnostics, including the only functioning CAT scanner in northern Gaza. Explains why Nasser Hospital and other facilities report non-healing wounds and care collapse amid displacement and fuel shortages. thenationalnews.com ↗

Deep brief →

US-Iran-Houthi confrontation over Hormuz and Red Sea · situation → , gradual pace

Hormuz remains effectively closed with no formal US counter-offer conveyed via mediators…

The United States, Iran and the Iran-backed Houthis are contesting two shipping chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman and the Red Sea route past Yemen. Washington says its strikes aim to degrade Iran's ability to attack commercial shipping and ensure freedom of navigation.

Numbers match the timeline. Solid mark: researched; hollow: reported. Infrastructure, lettered by type (A airbase, F fuel depot, H port, R refinery, P power plant); colour is the latest status on record: claimed struck (a party's claim only), damage reported, damage confirmed or destroyed, restored, nothing on record. A claim is a party's word, not a confirmation; marks fade as a status ages. Power plants: WRI Global Power Plant Database (CC BY 4.0).
Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Locations: Ohmega, from today's developments; approximate. Interactive basemap: OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors.
  1. 2 Oct
Assessment and what changed · the full read, since yesterday

Hormuz remains effectively closed with no formal US counter-offer conveyed via mediators as of Oct 2-3, keeping the core oil and LNG disruption in place. The confrontation widened off the water: the UK investigation into an alleged plot at RAF Fairford advanced with a new arrest and a public attribution to Iran that Tehran denies, while the Red Sea front stayed under Houthi pressure with the Saudi bypass pipeline still degraded. Confidence is high on the shipping and market data and on the investigative steps; lower on attribution and on private US intentions.

  • New: RAF Fairford probe 25-year-old British-Iranian arrested 2 Oct and bailed 3 Oct; Iran summoned UK ambassador 2 Oct — advances beyond 1 Oct attribution
  • Eased: Market pricing Brent eased to 102.25 USD/bbl 2 Oct (-2% on week) and TTF up only modestly, but levels remain ~59% and ~138% above a year ago…

2 unchanged: Hormuz diplomatic deadlock — no new formal US reply via mediators reported since Oct 2; Trump rejection of 26 Sept remains the last public US position. · Houthi-Saudi front: no new strikes reported Oct 2-3 beyond sustained control of Mayun/Bab el-Mandeb and pipeline outage; UN envoy call to contain Taiz fighting is new diplomatic pressure.

More developments (1)
  1. 30 Sept4
Pulses (8) · how tense, 0 to 100

A Pulse is a 0 to 100 gauge of how tense one specific situation is, from calm at the bottom to extreme at the top. It is reassessed whenever new evidence arrives, so the number moves with events.

model-assessed
Outlook, watch list and background

Outlook Hormuz is likely to stay closed in the near term absent a formal US counter-offer via Qatar/Oman; Iran has said it will not move without its conditions met. UK-Iran tensions are likely to rise further if police/CPS bring charges or disclose evidence linking suspects to Iran. Red Sea risk is likely to persist with Houthi control of Mayun and the Yanbu pipeline degraded, keeping both chokepoints disrupted.

Watch for
  • Formal US reply or counter-offer via Qatar/Oman mediators and Iran's response
  • UK police/CPS charging decision and any evidence disclosed on Iran link to RAF Fairford
  • Further Houthi launches toward Riyadh/Khamis Mushait/Jizan or Saudi strikes around Mocha/Bab el-Mandeb
  • Confirmation of French air-defence deployment to Yanbu and Patriot battery operational status in Saudi Arabia/Qatar
  • IMF PortWatch/EIA updates on Hormuz/Bab el-Mandeb transits and any demining or tanker convoy activity
Background
  • 28 Feb 2026US-Israel strikes on Iran began 28 Feb 2026 (Operation Epic Fury); Iran closed/restricted Hormuz the same day, triggering the largest oil supply disruption on record. Hormuz averaged ~20m b/d in 2024 (~20% of global liquids, >25% of seaborne oil, ~20% of LNG). Explains why current 1 ship/day transits represent near-total closure and why bypass capacity matters. eia.gov ↗
  • 17 Jun 202614-point Islamabad Memorandum brokered by Pakistan (with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt) was signed by US and Iran 17 June 2026 and briefly reopened Hormuz before collapsing within days. Framework China and others now cite for resuming dialogue; shows a prior reopening failed over shipping rules/fees. cfr.org ↗
  • 15 Sept 2026Bypass capacity around Hormuz via Saudi East-West (5m b/d, 7m temporarily in 2019) and UAE Fujairah pipelines is ~2.6m b/d, far below ~20m b/d that transits the strait. Pipeline strike at Yanbu leaves no viable workaround for Hormuz closure. eia.gov ↗

Russia-Ukraine war and European security architecture · situation → , gradual pace

Russia extended its Kyiv pressure campaign from energy to river crossings…

Russia is fighting to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence and to revise the European security order, while Ukraine is fighting to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity with support from European states and the United States.

Numbers match the timeline. Solid mark: researched; hollow: reported. Infrastructure, lettered by type (V vessel, B bridge, F fuel depot, P power plant, M military base, A airbase, R refinery); colour is the latest status on record: claimed struck (a party's claim only), damage reported, damage confirmed or destroyed, restored, nothing on record. A claim is a party's word, not a confirmation; marks fade as a status ages. Power plants: WRI Global Power Plant Database (CC BY 4.0). Other places: © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL).
Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Locations: Ohmega, from today's developments; approximate. Not on this map (too far away): 6 Seoul. Interactive basemap: OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors.

Grid impact · Ohmega analysis last report 15 days ago

0% claimed struck · 0 MWa party's own word
<1% damage reported · 600 MWowner, authorities or media
0% confirmed damaged · 0 MWoperator, authority or imagery
0% restored · 0 MW

Last 30 days, of 70 GW installed (nameplate) capacity the ledger knows. A plant can appear under more than one figure (claimed, then reported, then confirmed), so the figures overlap and are not added; the bars count each plant once, at the firmest thing said about it.

  • Confirmed damaged or destroyed
  • Damage reported
  • Claimed struck
  • Restored
3 plants named
  • 10-13Kiev · 440 MW hydro · Damage reported · said by Daily intelligence report
  • 10-14Kyiv-4 (Darnytska) Power Plant · 160 MW thermal & chp · Damage reported · said by reported via france24.com
  • 10-14Kyiv CHP-4 · capacity unknown other · Damage reported · said by Daily intelligence report (d5), reported via kyivindependent.com

Ohmega analysis from the asset ledger and WRI/OpenStreetMap capacity. Capacity is nameplate, not output; a status is not an outage duration; plant coverage is incomplete.

  1. 2 Oct2
  2. 1 Oct
  3. 3
Assessment and what changed · the full read, since yesterday

Russia extended its Kyiv pressure campaign from energy to river crossings, hitting the Southern Bridge in four waves Oct 1-2 and the Northern Bridge Oct 3, while sustaining 150+ drone salvos that killed at least 8 and injured 81. Moscow paired the strikes with explicit nuclear signaling over Kaliningrad and threats to European arms factories, met by an EU warning that such a strike would trigger Article 5, and formalized force growth and a China-involved Tsentr-2026 exercise. Confidence is high on strikes, bridges, warnings and the exercise (multiple confirmed sources); lower on North Korean troop numbers and the claimed Russian depopulation doctrine, which rest on single-side intelligence.

  • Escalated: Bridge campaign expanded from Southern Bridge (Oct 1-2) to Northern Bridge (Oct 3)…
  • Escalated: Nuclear/Article 5 signaling added Putin's Kaliningrad nuclear warning and Zakharova-Kubilius factory/Article 5 exchange were not in yesterday's section
  • New: Force expansion decree and Tsentr-2026 scale/Chinese participation detailed…
  • New: North Korean POW transfer rift with South Korea surfaced Oct 2…

1 unchanged: No new Polish/Romanian scrambles or hybrid sabotage incidents flagged in last 3 days; watch items on outages, repeated bridge damage and airspace incidents remain open.

More developments (3)
  1. 2 Oct6
  2. 1 Oct5
  3. 28 Sept4
Pulses (5) · how tense, 0 to 100

A Pulse is a 0 to 100 gauge of how tense one specific situation is, from calm at the bottom to extreme at the top. It is reassessed whenever new evidence arrives, so the number moves with events.

model-assessed
Outlook, watch list and background

Outlook Continued bridge and civilian-infrastructure strikes on Kyiv and other major cities are likely in the coming days as Russia sustains its winter pressure campaign, with a roughly even chance of further Polish air-defence activations during large salvos. A Russian strike on a European defence plant remains unlikely but would almost certainly trigger an Article 5 debate if it occurred, given the explicit warnings now on record. North Korean manpower and drone-production claims are likely to persist as an intelligence contest without independent confirmation.

Watch for
  • Whether Kyiv extends metro/bridge closures or reports structural damage requiring prolonged repair after repeated hits
  • Next large drone salvo size and any Polish/Romanian scramble or shelter warning during strikes
  • Any Russian statement or action toward European defence plants following Zakharova/Kubilius exchange
  • Confirmation or denial of additional North Korean deployments or Shahed production in North Korea
Background
  • 28 Sept 2026On Sept 28 Poland issued then lifted a shelter warning for eastern Lublin during Russian strikes on Ukraine, saying no threat in Polish territory while Polish jets operated - part of a September pattern of scrambles during large salvos. Shows the air-alert pattern that frames current Polish air-defence hardening and shoot-down rule changes. reuters.com ↗
  • 9 Sept 2025On Sept 9-10 2025, 19-23 Russian Gerbera decoy drones violated Polish airspace for 7h15m from Belarus; NATO shot down 3-4 and launched Operation Eastern Sentry on Sept 12. Baseline for current drone incursions and NATO's standing eastern-flank air-defence posture. nato.int ↗
  • 24 Sept 2026On Oct 1 NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and on Sept 24 Danish Defence Minister Jeppe Bruus/DDIS warned Russia will intensify systematic sabotage, arson and hybrid attacks in coming months. Frames the hybrid-war warnings that accompany the current kinetic escalation. dw.com ↗

Deep brief →

Ethiopia-Eritrea rupture and Tigray offensive · situation → , fast pace

Ethiopia and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties on Oct 1 in a tit-for-tat embassy closure…

Ethiopia, Africa's second-most populous country, and neighbouring Eritrea fought a long border war that left them in a two-decade no-war-no-peace standoff with no normal relations. A 2018 rapprochement in Asmara and Jeddah ended that freeze and earned Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize.

Numbers match the timeline. Solid mark: researched; hollow: reported. Infrastructure, lettered by type (A airbase, F fuel depot, M military base, P power plant); colour is the latest status on record: claimed struck (a party's claim only), damage reported, damage confirmed or destroyed, restored, nothing on record. A claim is a party's word, not a confirmation; marks fade as a status ages. Power plants: WRI Global Power Plant Database (CC BY 4.0).
Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Locations: Ohmega, from today's developments; approximate. Shipping data: IMF PortWatch. Interactive basemap: OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors.
  1. 3 Oct2
  2. 1 Oct1
  3. 3
Assessment and what changed · the full read, since yesterday

Ethiopia and Eritrea severed diplomatic ties on Oct 1 in a tit-for-tat embassy closure and expulsions, ending the 2018 rapprochement as fighting in Tigray intensified. On Oct 3 federal forces likely retook Mekelle's Alula Aba Nega Airport as TPLF fighters pulled back from the city, suggesting a battlefield reversal after TPLF gains on Sept 23, but telecom blackouts prevent independent verification. The rupture has already widened to Egypt and brought explosions to Addis Ababa, raising interstate war risk in the Horn.

Pulses (3) · how tense, 0 to 100

A Pulse is a 0 to 100 gauge of how tense one specific situation is, from calm at the bottom to extreme at the top. It is reassessed whenever new evidence arrives, so the number moves with events.

model-assessed
Outlook, watch list and background

Outlook Renewed federal push toward Mekelle and the severing of Ethiopia-Eritrea diplomatic channels make further escalation likely in the near term, with a roughly even chance of cross-border incidents if Eritrean support for rebels is acted on. Humanitarian access is likely to worsen as drone activity, air strikes and road closures continue, based on UN warnings Oct 2 and the ongoing Tigray telecom blackout. De-escalation would likely require AU or U.S.-backed return to the 2018 framework, but no dialogue has been reported.

Watch for
  • Whether ENDF enters Mekelle city centre or fighting shifts to Afar corridor toward Djibouti
  • Any Eritrean military mobilization or cross-border shelling/incidents
  • AU or IGAD mediation contacts and whether telecom/flight suspensions in Tigray are lifted
Background
  • 9 Jul 2018Ethiopia and Eritrea signed Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship on July 9, 2018 in Asmara (and Jeddah Agreement Sept 2018), ending 20 years of hostility after the 1998-2000 border war; PM Abiy Ahmed received 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for the rapprochement. Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea's 1993 independence and relies on Djibouti for >95% of trade. The Oct 1 severing of ties formally unwinds the framework the U.S. and AU are now urging parties to return to, and removes the diplomatic channel that had contained Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry. aljazeera.com ↗
  • 2 Nov 2022Pretoria Agreement (Agreement for Lasting Peace through Permanent Cessation of Hostilities) signed Nov 2-3, 2022 ended the 2020-2022 Tigray war; AU mediator estimated ~600,000 deaths. Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces against the TPLF in that war. Current fighting is the worst escalation since that war and inverts the previous alignment, with Eritrea now accused of backing the TPLF-led alliance against Addis Ababa. bbc.com ↗
  • 23 Sept 2026Fighting erupted Sept 23, 2026 between federal forces and a TPLF-led alliance across Tigray, Afar and Amhara after TPLF seized three federally controlled airports in Tigray and, in late September, formed the Alliance for Survival / Ethiopian Peoples' Forces Alliance for Survival with six other armed movements including Fano and Oromo Liberation Army to remove the Abiy government. Explains the trigger for the current offensive, the flight suspensions, and why the conflict now spans three regions and threatens the Djibouti corridor. aljazeera.com ↗

US withdrawal from Iraq after 23-year presence · situation → , flat pace

The September 30 completion of the US withdrawal from Erbil remains the defining fact with high confidence, confirmed by Pentagon, CBS and Al Jazeera

The United States has kept forces in Iraq since its 2003 invasion, while successive Iraqi governments have sought to assert sovereignty and Iran-linked militias, including Kata'ib Hezbollah, have pressed for an American exit and greater influence in Baghdad.

Numbers match the timeline. Solid mark: researched; hollow: reported. Infrastructure, lettered by type (P power plant); colour is the latest status on record: claimed struck (a party's claim only), damage reported, damage confirmed or destroyed, restored, nothing on record. A claim is a party's word, not a confirmation; marks fade as a status ages. Power plants: WRI Global Power Plant Database (CC BY 4.0).
Base map: Natural Earth (public domain). Locations: Ohmega, from today's developments; approximate. Interactive basemap: OpenFreeMap, © OpenMapTiles, data © OpenStreetMap contributors.
  1. 1 Oct2
  2. 30 Sept1
  3. 3
Assessment and what changed · the full read, since yesterday

The September 30 completion of the US withdrawal from Erbil remains the defining fact with high confidence, confirmed by Pentagon, CBS and Al Jazeera. October 1-3 has been quiet: no reported clashes, ISIS attacks, or new air-defense or militia-disarmament announcements, leaving the Kurdistan air-defense gap and the extended June 2027 weapons deadline as the central uncertainties.

Nothing changed since yesterday: No new clashes, ISIS-claimed attacks, or announcements of replacement air defenses or militia weapons handovers October 1-3; stasis on the three watch items from October 2. · Sovereignty Days holiday and political framing from September 30-October 1 remains the last substantive change; no escalation or easing detected.

Pulses (2) · how tense, 0 to 100

A Pulse is a 0 to 100 gauge of how tense one specific situation is, from calm at the bottom to extreme at the top. It is reassessed whenever new evidence arrives, so the number moves with events.

model-assessed
Outlook, watch list and background

Outlook Quiet likely to persist in the immediate days absent a trigger, but the air-defense gap over Kurdistan and the June 2027 disarmament deadline make renewed militia or ISIS testing likely over weeks. Whether Baghdad announces a replacement air-defense purchase or any militia begins weapons handover will be the clearest signal of whether sovereignty translates into control. No new US-Iraq bilateral security arrangement has been announced to replace the coalition framework.

Watch for
  • Whether Iran-aligned militias observe a halt to attacks on Kurdistan/federal Iraq and begin any weapons handover before June 2027
  • Any ISIS-claimed attacks timed to the withdrawal in federal Iraq or Kurdistan
  • Announcement of replacement air defenses for Erbil or new US-Iraq bilateral security arrangements for training/intelligence support
Background
  • 2024Under the 2024 US-Iraq agreement, the Global Coalition mission was to end in Iraq by 2025 and Operation Inherent Resolve by end of 2026, phased as federal Iraq bases by September 2025 and Kurdistan Region by September 2026. Explains why the September 30, 2026 Erbil departure was the scheduled final step, not an abrupt decision. cbsnews.com ↗
  • 2003-2014US military presence began with March 2003 invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, ended December 2011, and resumed in 2014 at Iraq's invitation to fight ISIS under Operation Inherent Resolve. Frames the 23-year presence and 12-year anti-ISIS campaign that just ended. cbsnews.com ↗
  • 28 Feb 2026The US and Israel launched war against Iran on February 28, 2026 (Operation Epic Fury); Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched more than 600 attacks on US citizens and facilities between February and April 2026. Recent war context that drove attacks on US forces and more than 1,000 drone/missile attacks on Kurdistan, shaping vulnerability after US air defenses left. cbsnews.com ↗
  • 2017-2025ISIS lost its territorial caliphate in 2017 and is now reduced to sleeper cells; in December 2025 two US soldiers and a translator were killed in an ISIS attack, followed by US retaliatory airstrikes. Baseline for assessing whether ISIS remnants exploit the withdrawal gap. cbsnews.com ↗